Introduction
For years I was a participant in one of the most violent drug trafficking organizations in the world, The Medellin Cartel. I participated in more crime than many people who are spending the better part of their lives in jail. I lived that life, in an undercover capacity, with the prior approval of many governments, including those of the United States, United Kingdom, and Subsequent to their conviction, I participated in months of debriefings of several of the convicted BCCI officers and was informed by them precisely how their bank developed money laundering techniques. It was their view that these techniques were adopted at BCCI after studying what they believed were the best money laundering methods used by executives in other institutions.
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In 1998, the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) estimated that the illegal drug trade generated retail sales of about $400 billion a year. 12 The global sale of drugs has dramatically increased since that time. From 1998 to 2008 sales of opiates increased by 34.5%, cocaine sales increased by 27%, and an 8.5% increase in cannabis sales has occurred.
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During roughly the same timeframe, The U.S. Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund
Reports to Congress demonstrates that the annual forfeiture of assets tied to the illegal drug trade did not exceed an annual average of $1 billion.
14 10 USA v. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International, 8:88-cr-00330-RAL-12, (Middle District, FL), 1988 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that less than 1% of the revenue generated by the illegal drug trade is seized each year by the federal agencies of the U.S. government, despite the fact that they are supported by literally thousands of state and local law enforcement officers that participate in drug investigations spearheaded by U.S. federal agencies. The only logical assumption from these statistics is that organized criminal groups engaged in the distribution of large quantities of drugs have such sophisticated assistance in the laundering of hundreds of billions in drug proceeds each year 11 Mazur, 12 UN General Assembly Special Session on World Drug Problems, (June 6 -8, 1998) 
Management of Illicit Funds
Historically, significant criminal organizations that possess large amounts of illicit funds tend to enlist money laundering related services from individuals who can provide credible assurances that the true source of the funds will not be exposed. Leaders of criminal organizations do not attempt to trick people into playing a role in managing their dirty fortunes. I experienced this first hand when dealing with key players within the Medellin Cartel. While functioning in an undercover capacity as a money launderer, during recorded conversations, I was blatantly told by people of significance within the Cartel that the millions of dollars at a time I received were generated from the bulk sales of cocaine, and that any errors made handling this money could cost me my life 16 .
At the same time, the officers at BCCI and other institutions that provided the critical assistance that resulted in the laundering of tens of millions in drug proceeds not only knew the source of the illicit funds, but repeatedly provided assurances that these transactions would be carried out with such sophistication that the source of the funds would not be detected. I was given guidance about the countries in which my accounts should be maintained to avoid detection by law enforcement, how customers at other banks got caught laundering money, how transactions would be structured to look legitimate, and many other assurances that those handling my accounts at the bank would run interference for me. 17 The promises extended to me as a private client of the bank are exemplified in a recorded statement with a Regional
Manager and member of the bank's Board of Directors, "You will find that we will be much more understanding. If some of our clients have a problem, we will try our best to hide it from the authorities, to give you as much cover as we can. It is in our interest to assist you and your Mazur, p.66; p.204 20 Mazur, p.123; p.214 o Loan accounts were created in the names of shelf companies secretly collateralized with deposits in accounts established in names of other off-shore corporations so the "loan proceeds" could be used without fear of authorities realizing we'd actually borrowed our own money.
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o Offers of outside service providers, like attorneys in Panama and Switzerland, were extended to facilitate the ease of acquiring off-shore corporations to front as the owners of funds placed in accounts I controlled.
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o Instructions to "Hold All Mail" were extended in writing to managers of foreign branches where accounts were established. The mail was put in safekeeping until I personally reviewed it abroad. These records were never sent to the U.S. in fear that authorities would intercept the mail and discover the accounts I secretly controlled.
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o In Panama, an account executive at the bank offered to manage a safe deposit box that both he and I could access so he could use the box to secure assets acquired on my behalf from third parties.
o Account executives were designated at branches to make visits to my clients in Colombia for the purpose of secretly reviewing records of account portfolios they discretely brought into the country, thus diminishing the chance that law enforcement might learn of the holdings they had with the bank.
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o Secret numbered accounts were established for me. o Offers were made to exchange U.S. currency for commodities, such as gold.
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o Information was intentionally stripped from wire transfers that would have otherwise accurately identified the true destination to which funds were sent. 21 Mazur, p.54; p.88; p.90; p.134; p 
BCCI Tactics Were Industry Common
Throughout the time that I dealt in an undercover capacity with corrupt bankers, as well as during debriefings of these same officers after their convictions, they repeatedly claimed that their criminal acts were no different than the acts carried out by similarly placed account executives employed in most other institutions involved in cross-border transactions. They specifically named the banks that competed with them to solicit deposits of dirty money, naming major banks in the United States, United Kingdom, Brazil, Germany, Switzerland and other countries. 28 They provided details, which were later independently corroborated, about one Swiss bank that was so aggressive about profiting from the marketing of drug proceeds that they arranged for a private jet to periodically fly boxes of gold bars to a remote airstrip in Colombia. The plane was quickly met by heavily armed cartel workers that rapidly exchanged duffle bags filled with blocks of currency wrapped in rubber bands for the stash of gold -which was sold by the bank at a price that was 15% under market.
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BCCI senior officers explained that, at the direction of the bank's President, they analyzed the availability of deposits from "flight capital" in Colombia and assessed it to be no less than $100 billion. They defined "flight capital" as underground money seeking secrecy and their analysis, a written report to the bank's President shared with board members, determined that the majority of "flight capital" available from accountholders in South America came from a mix of sources, including:
• Drug traffickers
• Money launderers
• Tax evaders
• Evaders of currency controls
• Evaders of Customs duties 28 Mazur, p.177; p.216; p.222; p.327 29 Mazur, p.328 • Wealthy individuals with inflationary concerns
But their final analysis confirmed that the greatest portion of this money came from drug traffickers and money launderers.
30
BCCI determined that, in order to compete with other banks vying for "flight capital" deposits from South American accountholders, they needed to pattern their branch network in a similar fashion to other international institutions. Their Latin American Division would need to be established in Miami, and they would need a supporting branch system in key areas like Grand Cayman, Luxembourg, Nassau, Panama, Switzerland, and other countries with strict bank secrecy laws. To feed this system with deposits, they bought an existing Colombian bank with a broad branch network within Colombia. They armed the branches within their Latin American division with a hundred new account executives with experience marketing "flight capital", many of whom were hired from other institutions. 31 A BCCI board member who formerly held a senior position with a major U.S. bank explained that the bank's mission was to gain power in the financial community by gathering deposits from every corner of the underworld. They laundered money, bribed regulators, corrupted politicians, and financed arms dealers.
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Other Banks Using Techniques Similar to BCCI
A series of public documents filed during the past several years detailing admitted criminal conduct at a dozen or more international banks related to the marketing of various forms of "flight capital" supports the hypothesis of senior BCCI officers that the illegal conduct they carried out is common in the international banking community. • Referring clients to outside service providers that created off-shore companies used as fronts for the ownership of accounts secretly controlled by U.S. citizens.
• Opening numbered accounts to hide beneficial ownership.
• Having account executives travel and visit clients to surreptitiously review records of account portfolios, thus avoiding the mailing of account records across borders that might otherwise be subject to inspection by Customs authorities.
• Establishing standing orders to "Hold All Mail" at foreign branches relative to accounts controlled by clients on whose behalf those accounts were secretly established, thus avoiding the otherwise risky mailing of account records across borders.
• Having account executives maintain safe deposit boxes at foreign branches for clients in which assets and records were stored on behalf of those clients.
• Using Panama, Gibraltar, and B.V.I. entities to establish additional layers of apparent ownership in accounts secretly controlled by clients.
• Using a certificate of deposit or other equity account secretly owned by an accountholder as collateral for a loan, in a like amount, to a separate off-shore The bank admitted that their conduct allowed certain customers to establish accounts in the names of Mexican currency exchange houses (casas de cambio) and launder no less than $21.6 million dollars in drug proceeds. UBC did this despite the fact that, for years prior to these events, U.S. law enforcement and regulatory agencies put the bank and the entire banking industry on notice that Mexican casas de cambio were increasingly being used by drug trafficking organizations to launder drug proceeds.
The transactions conducted by UBC for Mexican casas de cambio included:
• Accepting large cash deposits for a casa de cambio that had no known business to support such deposits.
• Accepting large volumes of traveler's checks and third party checks on behalf of businesses that had no retail business.
• Accepting large volumes of traveler's checks and third party checks that had many common earmarks of instruments purchased with drug proceeds, including many with sequential numbering (i.e. 30 sequentially numbered $1,000 travelers checks), many with markings consistent with their sale through black market money sources, many with improper endorsements, etc.
• Providing pouch services that enabled the cross-border transportation of large volumes During that timeframe, the bank:
• Agreed that no less than $110 million in drug proceeds were laundered through the bank.
• Agreed that, with funds moved through the bank from casas de cambio, drug trafficking organizations purchased aircraft from which more than 20,000 kilograms of cocaine was seized.
• Accepted nearly $14 billion in U.S. currency from casas de cambio and other correspondent bank customers and arranged the physical transportation of that cash to the U.S., where it was deposited.
• • Large cash deposits that were unsupported by the purported customer's business model
• Structured cash deposits in amounts of less than $10,000 conducted to avoid the filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs)
• Deposits of thousands of money orders and travelers checks, many of which were sequentially numbered
• Hundreds of incoming wire transfers originating from casas de cambio in Mexico 
Conclusion
The contention of BCCI officers that their criminal conduct is carried out by personnel within the business line at many international banks is supported by the considerable number of bank prosecutions that have been brought in the past several years.
RECOMMENDED REMEDY
The interests of significant criminal organizations to launder funds most often finds its way to that segment of the banking/business community that allows business line interests to override compliance risk assessment. One cannot accurately measure institutional compliance strictly by evaluating the acts of individuals employed within a bank's compliance department. An institution, such as Wachovia, with a professional compliance department that devoted substantial resources and energy to "find" suspicious events and "chase down" otherwise reportable transactions is, despite those efforts, still exposed to substantial risk of a crisis resulting from transactions related to serious criminal conduct.
To professionally manage this risk, an institution must establish visible financial and career enhancing incentives for business line personnel that contribute to the compliance mission. The business line must witness employee rewards that confirm an institutional will that promotes risk management over profits. An institution cannot afford to have two separate lines of thinking -one of risk management within compliance and a second of profits within the business line.
Efforts should be made to attempt to measure the "business line buy-in" to the compliance mission by reviewing the compliance related contributions of business line personnel. Factors such as the level of enhanced due diligence reporting conducted in good faith by account relationship managers and the instances of compliance successes precipitated by business line referrals are two indicators of an institution's "business line buy-in" to the importance of compliance. To promote these two factors, management must identify visible financial rewards for those business line personnel that provide the most genuine assistance to the compliance mission.
Measuring the "business line buy-in" and motivating the business line to contribute to the compliance mission distinguishes whether an institution's compliance program is likely to avert the type of scandal that many institutions have suffered during the past several years. The primary factor that each of these institutions exhibited was a business line that did not contribute to what appeared to be an independent compliance initiative by compliance resources.
